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INTRODUCTION
Twice in the last two decades, the Supreme Court has come within two
votes of declaring partisan gerrymandering-the manipulation of district
lines for partisan ends'-a nonjusticiable political question. Last Term, in
Vieth v. Jubelirer, Pennsylvania Democrats challenged an alleged
Republican gerrymander of the state's congressional districts. 2 Four
members of the Court thought the question nonjusticiable,3 and one, Justice
Kennedy, thought it justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause but
nonetheless rejected the plaintiffs claims.4 Eighteen years earlier, in Davis
v. Bandemer, a three-Justice plurality had held that a political group
complaining of partisan gerrymandering-the Democratic or the
Republican Party, as the case may be-could proceed with its equal
protection claim, but only upon a showing that it had been "denied its
chance to effectively influence the political process." 5
Such a test being, in effect, impossible for a major political party to
meet, Bandemer's promise that federal courts would be open to partisan
gerrymandering claims has proven an empty one. Indeed, despite
widespread belief that partisan gerrymandering impermissibly calcifies the
democratic process, 6 complaints alleging it rarely survive motions to
1. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1773 n.1 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 696 (7th ed. 1999)).
2. Id. at 1773.
3. Id. (arguing that no manageable standard exists for judging partisan gerrymandering
claims).
4. Id. at 1797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[I]f a subsidiary standard could
show how an otherwise permissible classification, as applied, burdens representational rights, we
could conclude that appellants' evidence states a provable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
standard.").
5. 478 U.S. 109, 132-33 (1986) (plurality opinion).
6. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1643, 1661 (1993) ("Before any votes are cast in
representative elections, before any candidate has filed for office or begun campaigning, the
political process has been ordered-generally by a political body composed of the incumbent
representatives or their political allies-through the process of determining the electoral
configurations in which the balloting will occur."); Michael E. Lewyn, How To Limit
Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REv. 403, 407 (1993) (calling partisan gerrymandering "especially
pernicious"); Jackson Williams, The Courts and Partisan Gerrymandering: Recent Cases on
Legislative Reapportionment, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 563, 595 (1994) ("Gerrymandering can stifle
debate entirely, as where incumbent legislators face no opposition at all in their 'safe districts.').
More than eighty percent of House incumbents running for reelection in 2002 won their races by
margins greater than twenty percent. Ctr. for Voting & Democracy, Overview: Dubious
Democracy 2003-2004, http://www.fairvote.org/dubdem/overview.htm (last updated Apr. 2,
2004). Only four out of 386 House incumbents running for reelection in 2002 lost seats to
nonincumbents. Id.
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dismiss. 7 Thus, even while conceding that severe partisan gerrymanders are
inconsistent with democratic principles, 8 Justice Scalia wrote for the Vieth
plurality that "no judicially discernible and manageable standards for
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged." 9
But a curiosity persists. While the Vieth plurality may be correct that
the standard for judging partisan gerrymandering claims under the Equal
Protection Clause has been filled with peril, the Court's own jurisprudence
potentially supports analysis of such claims under a very different
constitutional provision. The central difficulty of using the Equal Protection
Clause in partisan gerrymandering cases is that equal protection analysis
relies on evaluating the permissibility of a given classification; unlike racial
classifications, the Court does not generally view political classifications as
per se impermissible.10 In Cook v. Gralike,t' however, seven members of
the Court, Justice Scalia among them, backed the proposition that Article I,
Section 4 of the Constitution, which grants state legislatures the power to
regulate the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Congress,
12
limits that power to so-called "'procedural regulations."",13 It does not grant
states the authority to "attempt[] to 'dictate electoral outcomes.' 1 4
If this broad language is to be taken seriously, its reach is monumental.
The Gralike Court had to decide whether the Missouri legislature could
designate on the ballot whether congressional candidates supported a
federal term limits amendment. Whether these actions represent "attempts
to 'dictate electoral outcomes"' seems a much closer question than whether
partisan gerrymandering does so. Even ardent defenders of the practice
acknowledge that in purposefully manipulating district lines, state
legislators hope to dictate electoral outcomes at least as much as
7. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1778 n.6 (plurality opinion) (collecting nineteen cases).
Embarrassingly, the only time a plaintiff prevailed under the Bandemer standard, when a North
Carolina district court found in favor of the state Republican Party in a challenge to the state's
judicial election system, every Republican candidate in the purportedly gerrymandered superior
court judge districts subsequently managed to win election-just five days after the court
decision. See Republican Party of N.C. v. Hunt, No. 94-2410, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029 (4th
Cir. Feb. 12, 1996) (per curiam). The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court in light
of the election results. Id.
8. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1785 (plurality opintion) (stating that the plurality "do[es] not disagree
with" Justice Stevens's judgment regarding "the incompatibility of severe partisan gerrymanders
with democratic principles").
9. Id. at 1778.
10. See id. at 1798 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
11. 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
12. The Elections Clause reads, in full, "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
13. Gralike, 531 U.S. at 523 (quoting U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833
(1995)).
14. Id. at 526 (quoting U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833-34 (1995)).
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proponents of pejorative ballot labels do."5 Proponents and opponents of
gerrymandering disagree only on the propriety of doing so.
Courts hearing gerrymandering cases have not generally taken judicial
notice of the reviewing "standard" announced in Gralike-a blanket
prohibition on attempts to influence the outcome of elections 6-and even
the wishful thinking of the academy has largely ignored the link between
Gralike and partisan gerrymandering.1 7 Indeed, the Vieth appellants
themselves hardly pressed the point. Though they devoted a subsection of
their merits brief to the limitations the Elections Clause imposes upon the
states, they made no effort to articulate a gerrymandering standard
consistent with those limitations,18 instead relying primarily on the Equal
Protection Clause. As Justice Scalia notes, the Elections Clause is invoked
"only fleetingly" in the brief.' 9 "It is.. . asking too much," the brief
concedes, "to expect line-drawers never to consider the goal of gaining
partisan advantage in particular districts.
20
Another reason why the Pennsylvania Democrats may have been wary
of reading too much into the Elections Clause is that a prohibition on
attempts to dictate electoral outcomes may do much more than ban the
15. See, e.g., Lee Hockstader, A Texas-Sized Brawl over Redistricting; Fleet-Footed
Democrats Win Key Battle, but War Is Just Beginning, WASH. POST, May 17, 2003, at A3
(quoting U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Tex.), discussing the impetus behind a
proposed gerrymander by the Republican-led state legislature ("I'm the majority leader, and we
want more seats.")).
16. See, e.g., Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (E.D. Tex. 2004) ("Unless and until
Congress chooses to act, the states' power to redistrict remains unlimited by constitutional text.").
Session addressed the question of whether the Texas legislature could redistrict mid-decade. Judge
Ward did write that a state engaged in "extreme partisan gerrymandering" is able to "dictate
electoral outcomes" and thus would appear to exceed its power under the Elections Clause, but he
did not further say what distinguishes "extreme" from "routine" gerrymandering. Id. at 516
(Ward, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens mentioned the limitations
imposed by the Elections Clause in his Vieth dissent, but only to support his claim that the
gerrymander at issue violated the Equal Protection Clause. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769,
1808 & n.26 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (writing that the Equal Protection Clause
"implements a duty to govem impartially" that is "buttressed by" the holding in Gralike that "the
Elections Clause is not a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes" (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Neither Judge Ward in Session nor Justice Stevens in Vieth mentioned that Gralike
expressly prohibits "attempts."
17. Although Samuel Issacharoff has proposed an aggressive approach to judicial review of
partisan gerrymandering claims that would render suspect all purposeful redistricting, see Samuel
Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REv. 593 (2002) (advocating a
per se rule against incumbent manipulation of district lines based on analogies to insider
manipulation of other competitive markets), I am aware of only one piece of scholarship that has
suggested that the logic of Gralike compels a hard look at partisan gerrymandering of
congressional districts, see Note, A New Map: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Federalism Injury,
117 HARV. L. REv. 1196 (2004) (arguing from Elections Clause doctrine that state legislatures
should not have the power to gerrymander).
18. See Brief for Appellants at 25-29, Vieth (No. 02-1580).
19. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1792 (plurality opintion).
20. Brief for Appellants at 32.
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unilateral gerrymander they challenged. It also would appear to threaten
"bipartisan" gerrymanders, in which the two major parties collude to strike
a districting balance calibrated to protect incumbents.21 Far more alarming
to the traditional liberal opponents of partisan gerrymandering,22 the intent
standard announced in Gralike may, as applied to districting, threaten racial
gerrymandering as well. It may in essence amount to a declaration that the
biggest flaw of the Shaw v. Reno line of cases,23 which declared it
unconstitutional for states to use race as the predominant factor in drawing
district lines, was that those cases did not go far enough. No less than
partisan gerrymanders, racial gerrymanders are, baldly, attempts to dictate
electoral outcomes. 24 Couple these results with the perceived practical
hurdles of expunging politics from district line drawing, and the pro-
Elections Clause constituency begins to dwindle significantly.
An "attempts" standard may for these reasons be a losing argument
before the Supreme Court. But if we believe that the constitutionality of
manipulating district lines for partisan advantage rests solely on the claim
that manageable judicial standards are unavailing, then none of these
reasons should relieve conscientious commentators of the duty of exposing
that claim to rigorous scrutiny. As with any argument of constitutional
dimension, Justice Stevens's argument for the Gralike majority, an
extension of his majority opinion in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,25 cannot
be answered with a reflexive pragmatic response. Our common law
constitutionalism requires us to extend logic and principle to their
permissible limits before rejecting their less considered applications. Thus,
this Note first asks whether the construction of the Elections Clause
propounded in Gralike and U.S. Term Limits is historically accurate;
second, whether applying it to partisan gerrymandering is appropriate; and,
third, assuming such application is appropriate, how judges might actually
go about it. Does the Elections Clause restrict states to procedural tinkering
over voter registration forms and polling locations, committing them not to
21. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (upholding the constitutionality of a
bipartisan gerrymander).
22. Among the amici curiae in support of the Democrats in Vieth were the ACLU, the
Brennan Center for Justice, Common Cause, and Public Citizen.
23. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
24. This Note remains silent on the question of whether its proposed standard outlaws racial
gerrymanders. See infra note 201.
25. 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (invalidating an Arkansas state constitutional amendment imposing
term limits on the state's congressional representatives, on the grounds that the amendment
exceeded the state legislature's powers under the Qualifications Clauses and the Elections
Clause). The U.S. Term Limits Court wrote that "the Framers understood the Elections Clause as a
grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral
outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional
restraints." Id. at 833-34.
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attempt to dictate electoral outcomes? Does the express textual commitment
of oversight over such tinkering to the legislative branch-"the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators,26-limit, or perhaps even preclude, a role for
judges in regulating district line drawing? 27 Finally, if judges do have a role
to play, how, if at all, does judicial review under the Elections Clause,
rather than under the Equal Protection Clause, lighten the burden of
articulating a workable standard by which to police gerrymandering?
Answering these questions requires a backward look to determine what
was motivating the Framers when they inserted Article I, Section 4 into the
Constitution. This inquiry, which has not been conducted in the
gerrymandering literature, will be the central focus of this Note. I will
suggest that the Gralike Court's reading of the Elections Clause is accurate
in its essentials. It is appropriate to view the Elections Clause as a limitation
on the ability of state legislatures to manipulate the outcomes of
congressional elections. The Court should focus more, however, on whether
the legislature is in fact attempting to manipulate those outcomes rather
than on whether its regulations are labeled as "procedural." While ascribing
to the Framers an intent to eliminate partisan gerrymandering as we now
know it is perhaps anachronistic, the Framers did anticipate that
congressional oversight of electoral regulations would lead, through
institutional checks and balances, to federal elections conducted in the spirit
of republican government. Thus, the Elections Clause should be read in
pari materia with the Guarantee Clause. 28 This Note concludes that
although the Framers expected Congress, not judges, to police the
constitutional commitment to republican values, a contemporary
understanding of both the judiciary and of Congress dictates that identifying
state legislative capture of federal elections falls within the judicial
mandate.
The Note proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the historical roots and
judicial application of the Elections Clause. It examines Supreme Court
case law, discussions in and around the Philadelphia Convention, and the
far more robust debates over the Clause in the state ratifying conventions.
Part II briefly traces the history of partisan gerrymandering, from its
English use and abuse through its common practice in nineteenth-century
America, as well as the state constitutional norms that both encouraged and
curtailed it. Part III applies to modem gerrymandering the "republican
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
27. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 33 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder § 4, the
state legislatures, subject only to the ultimate control of Congress, could district as they choose.").
28. U.S. CONST. art, IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government ....").
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fairness" understanding of the Elections Clause that emerges from my
discussion of its history. I first note that the recurring themes of that history
parallel the themes animating the Guarantee Clause. I then suggest that the
advent of national political parties tends to shift institutional competence to
identify and condemn partisan gerrymanders away from Congress and
toward the judiciary. I conclude Part III with a novel proposal for how the
Court might effectively use its limited competence to police partisan
gerrymanders, namely by using a writ of mandamus to compel Congress to
fulfill its obligation under the Guarantee Clause to provide the states with a
republican form of government.
I. THE MEANING OF THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE
This Part considers the fundamental purpose behind the Elections
Clause. To provide doctrinal context, it begins with a survey of the
Supreme Court's Elections Clause jurisprudence before proceeding into a
historical inquiry. I consider the Constitutional Convention in Section B
and the state ratification debates in Section C.
A. The Elections Clause in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has provided relatively little guidance as to the full
scope of the Elections Clause. Where it has spoken on the Clause, as often
as not it has failed to so with one clear voice.29 Until U.S. Term Limits was
decided a decade ago by a sharply divided Court, two vaguely contradictory
strands of doctrine remained extant. In a line of cases beginning with Ex
parte Siebold,3 ° the Court had held that nothing in the Clause itself limits
the ways in which either the states or the Congress may exercise their
regulatory powers. Siebold involved the question of whether Congress had
the power under Article I, Section 4 to create criminal penalties for
violations of its election laws. Justice Bradley appeared to think it an easy
question: Congress may regulate House and Senate elections as it pleases.3'
Although the Siebold Court had no cause to address whether the Elections
29. Compare Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 256, 256-58 (1921) (suggesting that
the "natural and usual sense" of the words of the Elections Clause does not contemplate the
Clause's application to state primary elections), with United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317-
20 (1941) (reaching the opposite conclusion).
30. 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
31. Wrote Justice Bradley,
"Make or alter:" What is the plain meaning of these words? If not under the
prepossession of some abstract theory of the relations between the State and national
governments, we should not have any difficulty in understanding them.... [T]he
power of Congress over the subject is paramount.
Id. at 383-84.
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Clause imposed any limitations on state governments independent of
congressional regulation, nothing in the opinion suggests any such
limitations. Wrote Justice Bradley, "If Congress does not interfere, of
course [election regulations] may be made wholly by the State; but if it
chooses to interfere, there is nothing in the words to prevent its doing so,
either wholly or partially."
32
The implication that the Elections Clause is not a self-executing
limitation on state legislatures was not expressly repudiated for the next 115
years.33 Justice Harlan followed Siebold most directly in his dissent in
Wesberry v. Sanders, in which he argued that the Constitution does not
require a principle of one person, one vote in federal elections.34 The
Elections Clause, he wrote, "states without qualification that the state
legislatures shall prescribe regulations for the conduct of elections for
Representatives and, equally without qualification, that Congress may make
or alter such regulations. There is nothing to indicate any limitation
whatsoever on this grant of plenary initial and supervisory power.,
35
Gralike and U.S. Term Limits imply quite the opposite, however,
holding that a state's power to regulate congressional elections is in fact
limited to "procedural" regulations. This doctrinal turn results from a
contestable reading of the 1932 case of Smiley v. Holm.36 In Smiley, the
Court decided that the regulatory power the Elections Clause conferred
upon the state legislatures was not exempt from the restrictions individual
state constitutions imposed on lawmaking powers.37 In discussing the text
of the Clause, however, Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the Court,
It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace
authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections,
not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices,
registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention
of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of
inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election
returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to
procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in
order to enforce the fundamental right involved.38
32. Id. at 383.
33. See, e.g., Classic, 313 U.S. at 311 ("[S]ubject to the legislative power of Congress under
§ 4 of Article I, and other pertinent provisions of the Constitution, the states are given, and in fact
exercise, a wide discretion in the formulation of a system for the choice by the people of
representatives in Congress.").
34. 376 U.S. 1, 20-49 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 29-30.
36. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
37. Id. at 367-68.
38. Id. at 366 (emphasis added).
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In Wesberry, Justice Harlan dismissed this language as essentially
dicta,39 and even if Chief Justice Hughes's list is binding, it hardly seems
meant to be exhaustive.4 ° Indeed, the preface that the Elections Clause was
meant to be a "complete" code seems to foreclose an expressio unius
construction of the enumerated items. For most of its precedential life,
therefore, Smiley has stood more for the proposition that congressional
oversight of state election regulations is comprehensive,41 not that its
exemplary list of election regulations is itself the upper limit on state
legislative power.
Justice Stevens nevertheless extracted great mileage from this list in
U.S. Term Limits and in Gralike. U.S. Term Limits involved a challenge to a
referendum amending the Arkansas Constitution to impose term limits on
the state's federal congressional delegation.42 Although the opinion relies
principally on Article I, Sections 2 and 3, which set forth the qualifications
for membership in the House of Representatives and the Senate
respectively, Justice Stevens sought additional support in Article I, Section
4. Relying on the idea that any power the Elections Clause grants to the
states it must also grant to Congress,43 Justice Stevens called it
"unfathomable" to imagine that the Framers of the Constitution would have
allowed Congress to set its own qualifications." Therefore, "[t]he Framers
intended the Elections Clause to grant States authority to create procedural
regulations, not to provide States with license to exclude classes of
candidates from federal office. 45 Stevens relied on only a small assortment
of historical materials, namely the rhetoric of James Madison at the
Constitutional Convention and Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 60.
39. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 46 n.55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40. It is perhaps of interest, however, that among his other activities between stints on the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Hughes was counsel for the state of Michigan in Newberry v. United
States, 256 U.S. 282 (1921).
41. See, e.g., Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 71 n.2 (1997).
42. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
43. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 382-94 (1880) (discussing the concurrent power
conferred by the Elections Clause). Because regulating federal elections is not a "reserved" power
of the states, the Elections Clause is the only source of state authority over them. But see infra text
accompanying notes 98-99 (discussing the possibility that districting is a "reserved" power).
44. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 832.
45. Id. at 832-33. Although Justice Stevens was rightly suspicious of superficially boundless
grants of congressional power, that suspicion is not controlling. If the Qualifications Clauses are
inalterable of their own force, then they yield no information about the scope of the Elections
Clause. That the Elections Clause is limited to "procedural" regulations may, but does not
necessarily, follow from the supposition that the Framers would not have wanted to enable
Congress to set its own qualifications. One logical possibility, for example, is that Congress's
Elections Clause power was meant to extend beyond "procedural" regulations except to the extent
that it infringed upon the Qualifications Clauses or other independent constitutional provisions.
Thus the language about "procedural" regulations is essentially dicta: Justice Stevens's prudential
argument does not link the Qualifications Clauses to this particular limitation on the Elections
Clause.
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Six years after U.S. Term Limits, in Gralike, Justice Stevens marshaled the
language of Smiley, 6 but no additional historical support, to further assert
that the Elections Clause, without more, forbids states from "attempt[ing] to
'dictate electoral outcomes."'
47
Both U.S. Term Limits and Gralike, like many Elections Clause
opinions before them, fail to engage comprehensively the available
historical materials. To be fair, such canvassing will not necessarily prove
conclusive, nor will it necessarily prove Justice Stevens wrong. I do,
however, think it important to examine with some rigor the context in
which the Framers of the Elections Clause were operating if we are to credit
so aggressive an interpretation as Gralike's. This inquiry is especially
important given that the few opinions that confront the ratification debates
tend to do so in the service of the view that Congress's oversight power
provides the exclusive remedy for districting abuses within the states, 48 a
view contrary to Justice Stevens's in Vieth and Bandemer. To wit, I devote
the next two Sections to the Federal Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia and to the state ratifying conventions, in an effort to excavate
as much meaning as possible from the Elections Clause.
B. The Philadelphia Convention and Its Aftermath
The power to elect-or not to elect-is the power to destroy, a truism
flexible enough to provide fodder to either side in the great debate over the
degree of confederation the United States of America was to instantiate in
1787. Anti-Federalists could claim that federal interference in electoral
regulation was a slippery slope to the end of state sovereignty, whereas
Federalists could argue that the federal government, like all of the states
themselves, must have ultimate control over its own composition. The
Elections Clause debate, and the concurrent sovereignty solution that
emerged from it, was thus a microcosm of the larger federalism debate that
continues to this day.
Federal control over congressional elections proved far less
controversial at the Convention than in those of the several states. The
Articles of Confederation, which self-consciously instituted more a "firm
league of friendship, 49 than a united nation, may provide some clues as to
why. The Articles left no doubt as to who controlled elections to the
unicameral Congress: "For the more convenient management of the general
46. Cook v. Graike, 531 U.S. 510, 523-24 (2001).
47. Id. at 526 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 833-34).
48. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1775-76 (2004); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,
30-42 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. I1.
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interests of the united states, delegates shall be annually appointed in such
manner as the legislature of each state shall direct ....,,50 The delegates
were to meet in Congress at a particular time and were to have certain term
limits,5 but the details of their selection were left to the states as exercises
of their "sovereignty, freedom, and independence., 52 This hands-off policy
was part of the central dysfunction of the Articles. Virtually nothing of
consequence could occur in the Congress established by the Articles
without the consent of nine states.53 At the same time, and during a costly
war with Britain, the Articles required states to pay for their delegates to
attend meetings. 54 It is easy to guess how this story ends. By the summer of
1787, it was obvious that the very existence of Congress could not
thenceforward be subject to the whims of a small number of individual
states.
Due perhaps to this concession, the Elections Clause was essentially
uncontroversial at the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. The
template for the Elections Clause appears to have been part of South
Carolina delegate Charles Pinckney's draft constitution of May 29.
Article V of that draft read as follows: "Each state shall prescribe the time
and manner of holding elections by the people for the House of Delegates;
and the House of Delegates shall be the judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their members."56 Thus the states were given power over
"time and manner," without plenary congressional oversight but with
limitations on qualifications to be established by Congress itself.
There is no recorded debate over the Clause until after it emerged from
the Committee of Detail on August 6 as the first section of Article VI,
saying something quite different: "The times and places, and the manner, of
holding the elections of the members of each house, shall be prescribed by
the legislature of each state; but their provisions concerning them may, at
any time, be altered by the legislature of the United States., 57 The Elections
Clause now appeared more to be a grant of power to Congress than to the
states. Subsequent discussions provide some insight into this
50. Id. art. V, cl. 1.
51. See id. art. V, cl. 2; see also id. art. II (leaving multiple details explicitly open).
52. Id. art. II.
53. See id. art. IX, cl. 6.
54. See id. art. V, cl. 3.
55. See 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA
IN 1787 TOGETHER WITH THE JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, LUTHER MARTIN'S
LETTER, YATES'S MINUTES, CONGRESSIONAL OPINIONS, VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY
RESOLUTIONS OF '98-'99, AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 146 (photo. reprint
1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
56. lid.
57. 1 id. at 225. The Clause allowing the House to judge the qualifications of its own
members remained in the same Article, now as the fourth Section.
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transformation. When the Elections Clause was considered on August 9,
James Madison and Pennsylvania delegate Gouverneur Morris moved to
change "each House" to "the House of Representatives." 58 This change was
motivated by the fact that the Senate was to be chosen by the state
legislatures; the language as it read thus enabled Congress to interfere in the
times and places of their meetings and to disrupt their selection
procedures.59 Although the motion was defeated,6° it would later be
partially vindicated by the addition of the words "except as to the Places of
chusing Senators."
Of greater substance, Pinckney and fellow South Carolinian John
Rutledge moved to remove Congress's oversight power from the Clause
altogether.61 Several delegates spoke against the motion. Morris objected
that states might engage in election fraud, and Massachusetts delegates
Nathaniel Gorham and Rufus King suggested that electoral oversight power
was essential to national government.62 Said King, foreshadowing his
arguments at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, "If this power be not
given to the national legislature their right of judging of the returns of their
members may be frustrated., 63 In other words, King viewed control over
elections as inherent in the idea of sovereignty; this was an argument that
appealed both to Federalists and Anti-Federalists.
The motion seems largely to have been put to rest by Madison, who
defended the wording of the Clause in a lengthy speech. Madison's
conception of the Clause extended beyond the practical concern over
making sure electors were seated according to the laws of the land. Rather,
Madison's was a story of ensuring uniformity that expressly contemplated
the ability of state legislatures to influence the results of elections through
ostensibly procedural regulations. Madison also gave the most
comprehensive description available of what was meant by the "manner" of
holding elections:
The necessity of a general government supposes that the state
legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common
interest at the expense of their local convenience or prejudices....
Whether the electors should vote by ballot, or viva voce, should
assemble at this place or that place, should be divided into districts,
or all meet at one place, should all vote for all the representatives,
58. See James Madison, Journal (Aug. 9, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 227, 239-40 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
59. See 2 id. at 240; see also 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 70 (remarks of Richard
Dobbs Spaight at the North Carolina ratifying convention).
60. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 238.
61. 5 id. at 401.
62. See 5 id. at 401-02.
63. 5 id. at 402.
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or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district,-these,
and many other points, would depend on the legislatures, and might
materially affect the appointments. Whenever the state legislatures
had a favorite measure to carry, they would take care so to mould
their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to
succeed.64
On this account, congressional oversight is a check not only on state
legislatures abdicating their duty to seat representatives, but also on their
political maneuverings. One might argue that Madison's speech reveals a
mistrust of state legislatures that is perhaps too deep to impute to the
Convention generally. However, not only was the Pinckney-Rutledge
motion defeated without any further recorded speeches in support, but
additional language was added on a motion by George Read of Delaware to
allow Congress both to alter and to make election regulations. 65 The only
other changes made to the Clause in Philadelphia were cosmetic.
The Federalists knew they would not receive so free a ride in the state
ratifying conventions. The Anti-Federalist propagandist Federal Farmer
foreshadowed the fight to come in the states in his third letter, criticizing
the Elections Clause as an invitation to self-dealing by Congress.6 6 Through
Article I, Section 4, he writes, "the general legislature may... evidently so
regulate elections as to secure the choice of any particular description of
men."67 The principal concern evidenced in the letter is that Congress
would be inclined to force states to hold elections at large, and thereby
enable a minority of voters with concentrated interests to control a state's
entire slate of representatives.68
Writing as Publius in the lead-up to what would be a contentious
ratifying convention in New York, Alexander Hamilton defended the
Elections Clause in Federalist Nos. 59, 60, and 61. Given that in the first
exercise of its Elections Clause power, Congress would do the precise
opposite of what was feared by the Federal Farmer,69 Publius seems
particularly clever when he writes of this fear, "Of all chimerical
suppositions, this seems to be the most chimerical."7° Publius suggests that
the diversity of representation within the House would protect it from
capture by any particular class of individuals: "The dissimilarity in the
64. 5 id. at 401.
65. 5 id. at 402.
66. See Letter from the Federal Farmer (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in ORIGINS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 52,53 (Bruce A. Ragsdale ed., 1990).
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See Reapportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 2a (2000)).
70. THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 367 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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ingredients which will compose the national government, and still more in
the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches,
must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views in any partial scheme
of elections. 71 Publius's central affirmative defense of the Elections
Clause, the concern over self-preservation, is to be found in Federalist
No. 59. He writes, "Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive
power of regulating elections for the national government, in the hands of
the State legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union entirely at
their mercy.,
72
Absent from Hamilton's discussion-and understandably so, given the
audience he was trying to persuade-is Madisonian rhetoric about state
legislative influence over substantive electoral outcomes. In the parlance of
public choice theory, Hamilton was engaging in "costly" talk.73 Because his
words were those needed to win over skeptics, one might argue, they should
perhaps be given more credit in the interpretive exercise than those of
Madison, who could speak more ambitiously with the apparent support of
the Convention behind him. We shall see, however, that it is difficult to
justify so awesome and apparently limitless a power as that given to
Congress in the Elections Clause without adopting at least part of
Madison's rationale.
C. State Ratifying Conventions
The various debates about the Elections Clause within the state
ratifying conventions each had different loci, but all were chiefly about
federalism. As James Wilson observed at the Pennsylvania convention,
powers over elections "are enjoyed by every state government in the United
States.... and why should this be the only one deprived of them? Ought
not these, as well as every other legislative body, to have the power of
judging of the qualifications of its own members? ' 74 It was generally
conceded that any nation needed a means of self-preservation, but this
reason alone did not suffice to grant plenary congressional power over
elections. No fewer than six states-Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and South Carolina-passed
resolutions suggesting a constitutional amendment that would limit
Congress's power under the Elections Clause to cases in which states, for
71. Id.
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 59, supra note 70, at 363 (Alexander Hamilton).
73. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U.
PA. L. REv. 1417, 1445-46 (2003) (explaining the distinction between "cheap talk" and "costly
signaling").
74. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 510.
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whatever reason, neglected to make their own regulations. 75 Two of those
states, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, suggested in their amendments
that Congress also should be able to step in should a state "make
regulations subversive of the rights of the people to a free and equal
representation in Congress. 76 In determining the contours of the Elections
Clause, it is important to figure out what concerns motivated these
amendments and ultimately what, if anything, we can take from the fact that
no such language made its way into the draft Bill of Rights proposed by the
First Congress.
The many state convention delegates skeptical of the Elections Clause
raised two overriding and related objections. Several delegates, already
predisposed to oppose the Constitution, viewed the Elections Clause as
further evidence of a conspiracy to deprive the states of their rights and
institute a tyrannical national government. In North Carolina, which did not
finally ratify the Constitution until 1789, after George Washington had
already been elected President, Anti-Federalist Samuel Spencer spoke for
many when he said that the Clause "apparently looks forward to a
consolidation of the government of the United States, when the state
legislatures may entirely decay away. 77 But as mentioned, the Framers
were informed by their experiences under the Articles of Confederation.
During the Revolutionary War, South Carolina's capital had been taken
over by British soldiers, preventing the state from sending delegates to
Congress. Increase Sumner, a justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, invoked this episode during the Massachusetts ratification debates:
[I]f France and Holland should send an army to collect the millions
of livres they have lent us in the time of our distresses, and that
army should be in possession of the seat of government of any
particular state, (as was the case when Lord Cornwallis ravaged
Carolina,) and that the state legislature could not appoint
electors,-is not a power to provide for such elections necessary to
be lodged in the general Congress?7 8
The need for self-preservation, neglected during the Confederation, was
too strong to leave election regulations entirely in state hands. William R.
Davie of North Carolina called government without a means of self-
preservation a "solecism. ' 79 "The Confederation," he said, "is the only
75. See I id. at 322-30; 2 id. at 545; 4 id. at 246.
76. 1 id. at 322; see also I id. at 326 (demonstrating identical language in the New Hampshire
proposal).
77. 4 id. at 51.
78. 2 id. at 32.
79. 4 id. at 60.
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instance of a government without such means, and is a nerveless system, as
inadequate to every purpose of government as it is to the security of the
liberties of the people of America. , 80
A less reactionary objection was not to the grant of the power itself but
to its scope. Many state delegates criticized what they saw as an avenue
through which Congress might perpetuate itself in power or, echoing the
fears of the Federal Farmer, institute unfair at-large voting methods in the
states so as to favor particular interests. In Virginia, the staunch Anti-
Federalist Patrick Henry lamented that, through the Elections Clause,
Congress may provide that "[tjhe elections may be held at one place, and
the most inconvenient in the state; or they may be at remote distances from
those who have a right of suffrage: hence nine out of ten must either not
vote at all, or vote for strangers." 81 Samuel Spencer of North Carolina
suggested that Congress "may alter the time [of choosing senators] from six
to twenty years, or to any time., 82 "[A]s men have ever been fond of
power," E. Pierce was reported to have reminded the Massachusetts
convention, "we must suppose they ever will continue so."5
83
Perhaps. But many of these objections reflect a decidedly British
understanding of political power. As William Maclaine told the North
Carolina convention, "They talk as loudly of constitutional rights and
privileges in England as we do here, but they have no written
constitution.... [Here t]he legislature is to be guided by the Constitution.
They cannot travel beyond its bounds. 84 Thus, in response to charges that
Congress might use its Elections Clause power to deny suffrage, move
elections to other states, or extend its members' own terms of office,
proponents argued that independent constitutional provisions would
prohibit these moves.85 Article I, Sections 2 and 3 set the terms for the
House and Senate respectively and set the qualifications for membership
therein. Article V ensured that these could not be altered by congressional
fiat.
To the extent that these other constitutional provisions did not constrain
Congress, it was argued that the fact that members of Congress had to stand
for election provided a natural check on undemocratic or otherwise
tyrannical actions. In Virginia, Madison resumed his defense of the
80. 4 id.; see also 2 id. at 326 (remarks of John Jay at the New York convention) ("The
obvious meaning of the paragraph was, that, if this neglect should take place, Congress should
have power, by law, to support the government, and prevent the dissolution of the Union.").
81. 3 id. at 60.
82. 4 id. at 52.
83. 2 id. at 22.
84. 4 id. at 63.
85. See, e.g., 2 id. at 29-30 (remarks of Charles Jarvis at the Massachusetts convention); 4 id.
at 52-53 (remarks of James Iredell at the North Carolina convention).
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Elections Clause from the Federal Convention, saying that if Congress
shifted the place of elections to some inconvenient locale, "the members of
the government would be execrated for the infamous regulation. Many
would go to trample them under foot for their conduct; and they would be
succeeded by men who would remove it." 86 In other words, if Congress
acted improperly, the people would vote the rascals out. Or worse. Said the
colorful Massachusetts convention delegate Captain Isaac Snow of the
possibility that Congress might move the place of election "from Georgia to
the Mohawk River," "I stand ready to leave my wife and family, sling my
knapsack, travel westward, to cut their heads off."'87 And if such political
"accountability" was still lacking, there was always the judiciary. Though
the judiciary was not nearly as powerful then as now, North Carolina
delegate John Steele suggested that, unlike under the Confederation, "[t]he
judicial power of [the federal] government is so well constructed as to be a
check.... If the Congress make laws inconsistent with the Constitution,
independent judges will not uphold them, nor will the people obey them. 88
Steele was perhaps overly optimistic about the willingness of the
federal judiciary to involve itself in matters of election regulation. But the
constitutional structure offers another answer to the objection that Congress
will regulate improperly. Many convention delegates noted in support of
the Elections Clause that all of the unseemly regulatory powers that
opponents feared Congress would exercise could also be exercised by state
governments. 89 The key difference was that Congress, unlike state
legislatures, was institutionally constructed so as to minimize the danger of
abuse. Theophilus Parsons, who would later become chief justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, was reported to have enumerated
the checks and balances in place between the House and Senate:
These two branches... have different constituents, and as they are
designed as mutual checks upon each other, and to balance the
legislative powers, there will be frequent struggles and contentions
between them.... [I]f the federal representatives wished to
introduce such regulations as would secure to them their places,
and a continuance in office, the federal Senate would never
consent, because it would increase the influence and check of the
86. 3 id. at 408.
87. 2 id. at 34.
88. 4id. at 71.
89. See 2 id. at 33 (remarks of Reverend Samuel West at the Massachusetts convention)
("What hinders our state legislatures from abusing their powers? They may violate the
Constitution; they may levy taxes oppressive and intolerable, to the amount of all our property. An
argument which proves too much, it is said, proves nothing."); 4 id. at 61 (remarks of William R.
Davie at the North Carolina convention); 4 id. at 63-64 (remarks of William Maclaine at the North
Carolina convention).
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Representatives; and, on the other hand, if the Senate were aiming
at regulations to increase their own influence by depressing the
Representatives, the consent of the latter would never be obtained;
and no other regulations would ever obtain the consent of both
branches of the legislature, but such as did not affect their neutral
rights and the balance of government; and those regulations would
be for the benefit of the people. 90
It was thought that the House would be loyal to the people generally,
whereas the fealty of the Senate would be to the state legislatures. If either
were captured by aristocratic or other minority interests, the other would
not consent to the resulting pernicious regulations. No such native
institutional check constrained the actions of the various state legislatures.
This structural claim formed part of the argument against the
amendments limiting Congress's Elections Clause power that were
proposed in several state conventions. Many delegates noted that the
persistent self-preservation arguments in favor of the Elections Clause did
not explain why the powers it conferred on Congress had to be so robust.
Noting that proponents claimed "that this power was given in order that
refractory states may be made to do their duty," Phanuel Bishop was
reported to have asked in Massachusetts, "[b]ut if so, sir, why was it not so
mentioned?" 91 Because, asserted Anti-Federalist William Goudy in
response to similar objections in North Carolina, "that was not the reason,
in my humble opinion. I fear it was a combination against our liberties. 92
In a sense, Goudy appears to have been right, for the Elections Clause
should not be read merely as a prophylaxis against states' refusal or
inability to send delegates to Congress. It was also a remedy for all manner
of state regulations thought by the national government to be unjust or
inappropriate. Parsons was reported as suggesting that the Clause was to
guard against state legislatures that might "under the influence of ambitious
or popular characters, or in times of popular commotion, and when faction
and party spirit run high .... introduce such regulations as would render the
rights of the people insecure and of little value. 93 One example of such a
regulation would be "mak[ing] an unequal and partial division of the states
into districts for the election of representatives. 94 Rufus King and Judge
Francis Dana, also in Massachusetts, suggested that recent efforts by the
90. 2 id. at 26-27; see also 3 id. at 408-09 (remarks of Madison at the Virginia convention)
("The sum of the powers given up by the people of Virginia is divided into two classes-one to
the federal and the other to the state government. Each is subdivided into three branches. These
may be kept independent of each other in the one as well as the other.").
91. 2 id. at 23.
92. 4 id. at56.
93. 2 id. at 27.
94. 2 id.
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Rhode Island legislature to institute representations by corporation instead
of by population provided ready evidence that a state legislature may
"counteract the will of a majority of the people."95 In Virginia, Madison
warned a doubting James Monroe that "[s]ome states might regulate the
elections on the principles of equality, and others might regulate them
otherwise.... Should the people of any state by any means be deprived of
the right of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be remedied by the
general government." 96 Even Pinckney, who had moved to strike the
offending language at the Philadelphia Convention, defended the Elections
Clause oversight power before the South Carolina convention as necessary
"lest, by the intrigues of a ruling faction in a state, the members of the
House of Representatives should not really represent the people of the
state."97
Those limiting amendments that made it out of the state conventions
died en route to the First Congress's draft of the Bill of Rights. While this
fact alone is not conclusive evidence that Congress's Elections Clause
power was broader than remedying a state's refusal to seat representatives,
it places a heavy burden on anyone who might argue otherwise. The
Framers recognized two distinct possibilities: Not only might states not be
able to seat representatives, but they might through their manipulation of
election regulations do so according to decidedly nonrepublican principles.
Congress, whose institutional structure limited its own abuse of the same
power, could provide an effective cure to either problem.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the structure of the Elections
Clause is meant to allow Congress to police state legislative affronts to
republican government. On this view, Justice Stevens is correct that the
Clause embodied certain normative commitments that, at the very least,
disfavored state legislative control over electoral outcomes. This discussion
does not, however, answer two important questions. First, may we apply the
logic of these Election Clause commitments to modem partisan
gerrymandering, or would doing so be anachronistic? Second, to what
extent does the fact of congressional oversight preclude judicial review?
The next two Parts will address these two questions in turn.
95. 2 id. at 49 (remarks of Judge Dana); see 2 id. at 50-51 (reporting the remarks of Rufus
King, who mentioned Connecticut and South Carolina as additional examples).
96, 3 id. at 367.
97. 4 id. at 303; see also 2 id. at 510 (remarks of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania
convention) ("Let us suppose [the Elections Clause power] may be improperly exercised; is it not
more likely so to be by the particular states than by the government of the United States? ....");
4 id. at 67 (remarks of William R. Davie at the North Carolina convention) ("When aristocracies
are formed, they will arise within the individual states. It is therefore absolutely necessary that
Congress should have a constitutional power to give the people at large a representation in the
government in order to break and control such dangerous combinations.").
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II. THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE AND PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
As I have mentioned, uncovering the normative commitments of the
Elections Clause hardly ends the inquiry of the most importance to this
Note. Although the Elections Clause is the sole express source of state
authority over congressional elections, it may be plausible to read control
over districting as something other than the power to regulate time, place,
or manner of conducting elections. 98 On such a reading, the font of state
power over districting may be the Tenth Amendment, not the Elections
Clause, thereby subjecting that power to no limitations other than those
embodied in independent constitutional provisions such as the Equal
Protection Clause. There may be something to this view. When post-
Revolutionary state constitutions discuss the "manner" of holding elections,
they almost always refer to Election Day procedural matters. Should the
vote be conducted by ballot or viva voce?99 Who will collect the ballots or
record the votes?' 00 What shall be the age and property qualifications of
voters?' 0' As this Part will demonstrate, "district" lines at the time of the
ratification were generally based on preexisting municipal boundaries. It
was therefore assumed that states had the power-elemental to even the
thinnest conception of sovereignty-to alter them.
This fact alone is not, however, dispositive. Whatever the plausibility of
the view that manipulation of district borders was not originally
contemplated by the language of the Elections Clause, state legislatures
now control districting lines that affect the composition of Congress but
have nothing whatever to do with traditional political boundaries. It will be
useful, then, to cut the history into thinner slices. How did the norms
governing the alteration of district boundaries in 1787 compare to the
norms governing other election regulations? We have already seen that the
manipulation of district lines was cited in the Massachusetts ratifying
convention as an example of an unfair electoral regulation. 10 2 Determining
how this practice was perceived prior to 1787, in English practice, in the
colonies, and in state constitutions, can help us determine whether and how
to apply Elections Clause norms to modem gerrymandering. The more
disfavor visited upon the practice by these preexisting institutions, the more
98. See Robert Alexander Schwartz, The Nature of Consent in the American Republic:
Substance or Procedure? The Elections Clause and Single-Member Congressional Districts,
38 U.S.F. L. REv. 467 (2004) (arguing that the Elections Clause does not cover redistricting).
99. See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. II; MASS. CONST. pt. II,
ch. 1, sec. 3, art. Il; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. XIV; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. VI.
100. See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII.
101. See MD. CONST. of 1776, art. II.
102. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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plausible a claim that the Elections Clause can be read to constitutionalize
similar limitations.
The norms of interest to this inquiry are not accessible by reference to
the modem gerrymander. To get at the ancestry of the practice,
gerrymandering must be defined more broadly than its quotidian sense.
Black's Law Dictionary defines political gerrymandering as "[t]he practice
of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly
irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting
the opposition's voting strength."' 0 3 This relatively technical definition is
not the only available option. One could define gerrymandering in terms of
the district drawer's paradigmatic two-step of "packing" and "cracking" the
expected voters of a disfavored group into districts in which their votes are
ever less meaningful. 10 4 It will prove more useful for our purposes,
however, to take a less nuanced approach.
The nearly exclusive association of the idea of gerrymandering with the
manipulation of artificial district lines for partisan ends can be viewed as a
byproduct of the Supreme Court's one-person-one-vote requirement 0 5 and
the Reapportionment Acts of 1842106 and 1967,107 which required single-
member congressional districts based on geography. Article I, Section 2 of
the Constitution, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to require
proportional representation of the states within the House of
Representatives, barely tolerates even a de minimis deviation from
population equality among congressional districts within a state.' 0 8 Coupled
with the requirement of single-member districts, the one-person-one-vote
103. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (8th ed. 2004).
104. See Lewyn, supra note 6, at 406.
105. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (finding that unequal state districting
violates the Equal Protection Clause); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
106. Reapportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2a
(2000)). The 1842 Act was passed because allowing at-large electoral districts made it difficult for
minority political parties to have any power in Congress. See ANDREW HACKER,
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 40-41 (1963). It also
gave disproportionate influence in the House to small states, which were more likely than large
states to have unified interests. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY:
LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1157-58 (rev. 2d ed. 2002).
107. Act of December 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-196, 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. (81 Stat. 581) 633
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2000)). The Supreme Court ruled in Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1
(1932), that the equimember district requirements of the Reapportionment Act of 1842 had lapsed
with the passage of the Reapportionment Act of 1929, which set no districting criteria. Id. at 6-7.
108. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). The de minimis standard applies only to
federal elections. The standard for local elections is more lenient. See, e.g., Bd. of Estimate v.
Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 701 (1989) ("[T]he relevant inquiry is whether 'the vote of any citizen is
approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen' . (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at
579)).
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mandate is effectively an invitation to the party or parties controlling the
state legislature to stretch district boundaries into uncouth shapes.10 9
But it is important for the purposes of a historical inquiry that we not let
our familiarity with present statutory and constitutional constraints lead us
to think of gerrymandering in terms of districts, or even in terms of
malapportionment, though the two are often linked. Gerrymandering can be
understood rather as any artificial manipulation of political boundaries for
partisan ends. Although the first gerrymander is often reported as the
meticulously crafted districting scheme engineered by the Massachusetts
legislature and approved by the eponymous Bay State governor Elbridge
Gerry in 1812,110 the practice dates back much further. Indeed, any
suggestion that the scheme bearing Gerry's name was the first
"gerrymander" is undermined by its sophistication. Our story instead begins
in England, when parliamentary representation was in its relative infancy
and when "districting" had no meaning.
A. English Practice
The very first parliamentary "districts," echoing pre-parliamentary
judicial and administrative divisions, were preexisting political and
religious units. 1 ' They were not meant to represent individuals.1 12 The
1295 British Parliament was called by Edward I to represent the three
"great estates" of English society: the clergy, who were represented by two
archbishops and various bishops, abbots, and archdeacons; the gentry,
represented by earls and barons; and the citizens, represented by elected
burgesses.' 13 It has become easy to forget that "We the People" once
thought of ourselves primarily as members of communities rather than as
individuals; our understanding of the proper structure and overarching
purpose of representative government reflects this sociopolitical
reorientation. By some accounts, rather than viewing representation as an
honor and a privilege, Renaissance England saw it as a tax burden and
gerrymandered to avoid it. According to British historian Sir Courtenay
Ilbert, "Towns often desired not to be represented, and probably made
arrangements with the sheriff for this purpose. '' 14
109. See Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 103 (2000).
110. See ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 16-17
(photo. reprint 1974) (1907).
111. See COURTENAY ILBERT, PARLIAMENT: ITS HISTORY, CONSTITUTION AND PRACTICE
33 (new & rev. ed. 1920).
112. Seeid. at l3.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 35.
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In the sixteenth century, as political representation became more
valuable, the number of boroughs eligible for representation increased
dramatically. Each borough and county was to send two members to the
House of Commons, without regard to relative size.' 1 5 So-called "rotten
boroughs" were created, sometimes by fiat of local sheriffs, other times by
charter at the behest of the monarch or the House of Commons. The
parliamentary seats of these gerrymandered towns would either be bought
by local aristocrats or doled out by powerful benefactors to proxies,
enabling the Tudor kings and queens to wield more control over the
legislature. 116 Although the practice of creating rotten boroughs died down
by the end of the seventeenth century,1 17 it was not until the Great Reform
Acts of 1832 that 130 electoral units, many of them with remarkably few
constituents, were finally abolished. 1 8
Thus, even loosely equal representation was neither guaranteed nor
even aspired to. It is worth asking why such obvious discrepancies in
representation were tolerated. Even if democratic ideals then were far less
developed than they are now, one might think that the fact that the
institution of Parliament existed at all instantiates at least some expectation
of individual fairness. Not so. As David Butler and lain McLean point out,
the limited expectations resulted in large part from the fact that, both
historically and conceptually, towns, not individuals, were thought of as the
natural units of representation.119 The eroding tolerance for rotten boroughs,
then, was a crude but functional fairness norm. That individual rights were
not placed at a premium does not diminish the fact that a check on state
power to manipulate representation was increasingly expected. It was not
until a Lockean concern for individual rights took root in the political
culture that individual representation itself became normatively attractive.
That concern established itself most fundamentally, of course, on the other
side of the Atlantic.
B. Early Colonial and State Practice
As in England, the pre-Revolutionary practice in the colonies was to
divide legislative representation into counties, towns, or parishes.12 ° And as
in England, population inequality was both common and expected.
115. See David Butler & lain McLean, The Redrawing of Parliamentary Boundaries in
Britain, in FIXING THE BOUNDARIES: DEFINING AND REDEFINING SINGLE-MEMBER ELECTORAL
DISTRICTS 1, 3 (lain McLean & David Butler eds., 1996).
116. See ILBERT, supra note 111, at 35-36.
117. See id. at 36.
118. Butler & McLean, supra note 115, at 4.
119. See id. at 3-4.
120. See GRIFFITH, supra note 110, at 23.
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Municipal boundaries often coincided with the tides of local rivers and
constantly shifted when towns were threatened by indigenous peoples or
otherwise drained of population. 21 There is evidence, however, that the late
English frustration with rotten boroughs had an effect on colonial districting
practices. In 1705 the Virginia House of Burgesses passed a law "providing
that no county should be divided unless eight hundred tithables, or tax-
payers, remained in the upper county so formed."' 122 Thus the invention of
counties for the purpose of representation was made illegal. Early Virginia
practice also provides ammunition for the view that the improper alteration
of county boundaries did not necessitate an affirmative check, but rather
could be left to the political process. Writing in 1710 about the popular
practice of disturbing county lines for partisan advantage, Virginia
Governor Alexander Spotswood said that "the voters frequently considered
the attitude taken by the various candidates for the House of Burgesses
upon this question of the division of old parishes. It was often the sole issue
upon which the election turned."'
' 23
Research by Elmer Griffith uncovered further purposeful manipulations
of county representation and county boundary lines by the colonial
assemblies of New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.1 24 These
gerrymanders enabled the colonies to stack the legislature in opposition to
the British monarchy, and in turn, the Crown largely shut down the practice
by mid-century.125 As we have seen, the colonial memory of this heavy-
handedness from above haunted the state ratification debates over the
Elections Clause. If British oversight was problematic, however, it was not
from any love for gerrymandering, broadly conceived. "Equal"
representation was well understood conceptually among the states, but
examining their constitutions reveals that it just as often took the form of
equality among towns, counties, and parishes as among individuals.
It is worth noting here that analogies between the U.S. Constitution and
those of the several states as regards election regulation are necessarily
limited. Federalism as instantiated in 1787 was a bold new idea whose
contours had not yet been worked out. Whereas no state constitution
granted any substantial power over state legislative elections to individual
counties 26-the practice had long ago been abandoned in England-it was,
of course, thought natural by many in 1787 for the federal government to
leave regulation of elections for Congress entirely to the states. The
121. See id. at 25.
122. Id. at 23.
123. Id. at 25 (citing a letter from Governor Spotswood).
124. Id. at 26-29.
125. See id. at 28-29.
126. But see PA. CONST. of 1776, § 18 (giving individual counties interim power over the
intracounty districting process until a proper census was taken).
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question of control over the electoral process was not, among the states of
the Revolutionary era, a question of who-who else but the legislature?-
but rather a question of how.
Different states had different traditions with respect to the times, places,
and manner of holding elections, though every state that had a constitution
vested these powers in a legislative assembly. 127 State constitutions of the
period leading up to 1787 can help us begin to answer at least two
important questions that arise from the Elections Clause. First, and most
holistically, what kinds of fairness norms, if any, were embedded within the
language governing election regulations? Second, what procedures and
checks, if any, were in place for altering the boundaries of political units?
Answering these two questions can help us assess the plausibility of reading
the Elections Clause as imposing any limitations on partisan
gerrymandering. A prevalence of weak norms of fairness and equity in
election regulation generally, and in districting regulations specifically,
would undermine any claim that the Elections Clause was meant to restrict
malfeasance (rather than merely nonfeasance) in state legislative regulation
of congressional elections. If, on the other hand, state constitutional practice
tended to favor limitations on the ability of legislators to manipulate units
of representation for partisan purposes, the view that the Elections Clause
provides a means of nationalizing such limitations becomes more plausible.
All of the states considered counties or other preexisting political
entities as essentially indivisible units of representation, but one can
categorize the state constitutions according to the strength of their
proportionality norms. New York's Constitution of 1777, for example,
provided that assembly representatives for each county be apportioned
according to the results of a census to be conducted every seven years, such
that an extra representative be provided for every one-seventieth difference
in population between counties.128 Massachusetts and New Hampshire,
whose legislative election provisions were nearly identical to each other,
both provided for one lower-house representative for every 150 "ratable"
inhabitants "in order to provide for a representation .. founded upon the
principle of equality."' 129 The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 contained
a similar rule, though with more egalitarian pomp and less mathematical
precision. Although the initial allocation of representatives was to be equal
127. Connecticut and Rhode Island remained under their colonial charters until the nineteenth
century. See 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 143 (William F.
Swindler ed., 1973); 8 id. at 351. Connecticut's Charter of 1662 granted to the governor and six of
his twelve "assistants" power over "the disposing and ordering" of elections. CONN. CHARTER of
1662.
128. SeeN.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. V.
129. MASS. CONST. ch. 1, § 3, art. II (amended 1836); see also N.H. CONST. pt. II (amended
1877).
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as among counties (with the exception of the City of Philadelphia, which
was treated as a county), 130 a census would be conducted every seven years
to ensure representation according to the number of taxable inhabitants.1
31
This, the document tells us, "is the only principle which can at all times
secure liberty, and make the voice of a majority of the people the law of the
land.' 32 Had such language made its way into the U.S. Constitution,
Wesberry would have been more easily decided, but a canvassing of the
other state constitutions demonstrates that so strong a proportionality norm
was the minority view at the time.
Take, for example, the other of the original thirteen states whose post-
Revolutionary constitution made express provision for a regular census:
South Carolina. The rule of proportionality that the census was to serve was
not a headcount but rather a "property" survey. Every fourteen years, the
state was to be reapportioned "in the most equal and just manner according
to the particular and comparative strength and taxable property of the
different parts of the same, regard always being had to the number of white
inhabitants and such taxable property." 133 Though this provision is most
obviously a concession to slaveholders, it also reflects an attitude toward
representation that viewed equality among individuals more as a
background consideration than as democratic dogma. 134 South Carolina
seemed to aspire to nothing more precise than a loose accounting of the
approximate proportions of whites, slaves, and acreage by parish.
A more or less laissez-faire attitude toward proportionality was
prevalent in, but not confined to, slave states. The New Jersey Constitution
of 1776 provided for equal representation among counties but allowed these
numbers to be adjusted "at any time or times hereafter" if a legislative
majority should "judge it equitable and proper.' 35 Though such ad hoc
adjustments were to be made "on the principles of more equal
representation,"1 36 they were, importantly, recommendations rather than
requirements. The state constitution thus allowed for, but did not require,
proportional representation of individuals. The Delaware, Georgia, and
North Carolina constitutions generally gave equal representation to
130. For the political story behind the treatment of the City of Philadelphia, see GRIFFITH,
supra note 110, at 26-29.
131. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 17.
132. Id.
133. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XV.
134. Note that Massachusetts and New Hampshire apportioned their senate seats, though not
their lower-house seats, by taxable property. See MASS. CONST. ch. I, § 2, art. I (amended 1840);
N.H. CONST. pt. 11 (amended 1964).
135. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. III.
136. Id.
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counties, with no express provisions for adjustments at all. 37 Virginia did
so provide, but with an essentially toothless clause that did little more than
guard against the rotten-borough phenomenon. Each county was to send
two representatives to the House of Delegates, unless the county population
decreased such that for seven straight years it had less than half the number
of voters as another county, in which case it would no longer be
represented. 13
8
What can be said of these concededly divergent practices among states
is that there was a recognized norm of equal representation in the lower
houses of the legislatures, with differences over whether individuals,
property, or communal political units such as counties were the appropriate
referents. But apportionment provisions can only tell us so much about the
permissible moves of election regulation. If something can be said of state
constitutional limitations on the ability of the legislature to alter political
boundaries or to create new districts out of whole cloth, it may affect our
view of the Elections Clause.
The constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and
Pennsylvania explicitly allowed the legislature to create new districts,
counties, boroughs, and the like.' 39 Although these states all had relatively
strong proportionality rules, thereby preventing rotten boroughs, nothing in
the language of any of their constitutions provided any further limitations
on how political boundaries could be manipulated. Among states with
weaker proportionality norms, the constitutions of Georgia, Virginia, and
even South Carolina also (in theory) restricted the legislature's ability to
create rotten boroughs, but did not otherwise mention-much less
regulate-alterations of political units. The only hint, perhaps, of a
suspicious view toward the manipulation of political lines lay in the
constitutions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, which required that
when senate districts were changed, the assembly must "timely make [it]
known to the inhabitants of the commonwealth the limits of each
137. See DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. III; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. IV; N.C. CONST. of 1776,
art. III. Georgia provided linear proportionality for newly constituted counties, whereby they
would receive progressively greater representation as their number of voters increased, up to one
hundred, at which point they would receive the customary ten representatives. See GA. CONST. of
1777, art. V. North Carolina granted two House of Commons representatives to each county and
one each for certain towns. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. III.
138. See VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 25.
139. See MASS. CONST. ch. I, § 2, art. I (amended 1840); N.H. CONST. pt. II (amended 1964);
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XII ("And be it ordained, that it shall be in the power of the future
legislatures of this State, for the convenience and advantage of the good people thereof, to divide
the same into such further and other counties and districts as shall to them appear necessary.");
PA. CONST. of 1776, § 9 (granting the general assembly the power to "constitute towns, boroughs,
cities, and counties").
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district."' 140 District boundaries could be shifted, but legislators would have
to be politically accountable for their decisions.14' It is tempting to interpret
the paucity of state constitutional provisions discussing manipulation of
political lines for partisan ends as an indication that gerrymanders were
wholly tolerated. Such an interpretation would be anachronistic, however,
for it would presuppose of the colonists an understanding of modem
gerrymanders sufficient to guard against them expressly.
More instructive, as I have mentioned, are the interstices of the
constitutional texts. It is difficult to contest the conclusion that to the extent
the alteration of districting lines implicates congressional representation
(especially when it does not implicate municipal boundaries), such
alteration falls within the ambit of the Elections Clause. Not only did
Theophilus Parsons say so explicitly at the Massachusetts convention,1
42
but this appears to be the consensus view on both the present Supreme
Court and on all Courts in recent memory. What this examination of state
constitutions additionally reveals is that the power over districting was
unmistakably infused with a norm of equality, even if states diverged
radically on what "equality" entailed. Proportionality was of interest, but
not always essential. Rotten boroughs were clearly disfavored, but other
manipulations of political units apparently were constrained at most by
equality of population. As with other election regulations, there was an
abiding sense that republican commitments should be maintained; the
disagreement was over the relevant unit of concern. The federal system,
however, answered this question unequivocally in 1787: For Senate
elections, the unit was the state, and for House elections, it was the free
male citizen.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING UNDER THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE
Having established that Congress was expected to have a role in
ensuring that states used their Elections Clause power only for republican
ends, we are left to wonder how it should go about doing so, and whether
there exists any remedy for its nonfeasance. Although we have seen that the
state constitutions varied widely with respect to their baseline norms of
fairness and equality in election regulations, we find a potential source of
140. MASS. CONST. ch I, § 2, art. I (amended 1840); see also N.H. CONST. pt. II (amended
1964) (containing a similar provision).
141. It may be instructive to note that Massachusetts and New Hampshire were the only two
states to submit their constitutions to popular ratification. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (forthcoming Sept. 2005) (manuscript at 3, on file with author).
142. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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uniformity elsewhere in the Constitution, in the Guarantee Clause of Article
IV. This Part suggests that federal judges have the right and the obligation
to attempt to articulate standards under the Guarantee Clause that serve to
bind state power under the Elections Clause. It is for Congress, however, to
fashion a remedy for abuses of that power.
A. Ensuring a Republican Form of Government
The Guarantee Clause reads, "The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall
protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence."' 143 Republican government and election
regulation are, to state the obvious, intimately related. Given the concerns
over improper electoral moves that animated the grant of congressional
oversight power in the Elections Clause, the Guarantee Clause provides a
tantalizing guidepost for congressional exercise of that power. Several of
the Framers argued explicitly that the Guarantee Clause was meant to
protect the states from monarchical governments. 144 As Madison wrote in
Federalist No. 43, "In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and
composed of republican members, the superintending government ought
clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or
monarchial innovations."' 145 The state ratifying conventions discussed the
principles of republicanism far too much to fit within the scope of this Note,
but James Wilson, speaking at the Pennsylvania convention, summarized
the general sentiment: "The right of suffrage is fundamental to
republics. 146 The right is not merely instrumental to but constitutive of
republicanism. As Frank Michelman writes, "Any view in which the true,
primary interests of individuals are 'exogenous' or prior to politics is
unrepublican."'' 47 This sentiment runs exactly counter to the central conceit
143. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
144. See, e.g., 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 406 (remarking on the statements of
Edmund Randolph in Philadelphia); THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST
No. 85 (Alexander Hamilton).
145. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 70, at 274 (James Madison).
146. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 482; see also 3 id. at 367 (quoting James
Madison as saying that the Elections Clause contemplates that the "general government" should
provide the remedy "[s]hould the people of any state by any means be deprived of the right of
suffrage").
147. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 27 (1986); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the
Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 849, 868 (1994) (arguing that the
Guarantee Clause "is meant to protect the basic individual right of political participation, most
notably the right to vote and the right to choose public officeholders"); McConnell, supra note
109, at 106 (arguing that a republican form of government cannot be one in which "a minority
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behind gerrymandering. Any manipulation of district lines intended to
influence the outcome of House elections, particularly where the
Constitution has expressly committed the Senate to state legislative
selection, 148 is necessarily nonrepublican.
A glance back at the state and federal ratifying conventions reveals a
historical parallel between the Elections Clause and the Guarantee Clause
that buttresses their conceptual connection, namely that both seem
preoccupied with invasion. Recall Justice Sumner's worry about the
inability of a state government come under attack to send a representative to
the national Congress. 149 Both congressional oversight of election
regulations and the Guarantee Clause appear to have been motivated by a
fear of usurpation of the people's government. The Guarantee Clause
originally appeared as the eleventh resolution of Edmund Randolph's
Virginia Plan, worded as follows: "Resolved, That a republican constitution,
and its existing laws, ought to be guarantied to each state, by the United
States."' 150 Randolph declared that "no state.., ought to have it in their
power to change its government into a monarchy.",151 The resolution was
endorsed unanimously on June 11, 1787.152 On July 18, one month later, the
Convention considered the added words "and that each state shall be
protected against foreign and domestic violence."'1 53 Randolph made clear
that "[t]he resolution has two objects,-first, to secure a republican
government; secondly, to suppress domestic commotions."' 5 4 The added
language was also unanimously endorsed. 1
55
The Supreme Court has been generally unwilling to review cases
arising under the Guarantee Clause, 156 and in Baker v. Carr it particularly
refused to do so in cases involving congressional districting. 157 What is
notable about Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Baker, however, is not
its refusal to entertain the claim under the Guarantee Clause but its resort to
the Equal Protection Clause to supply the standard for decision. Proceeding
faction maintains control, and the majority has no means of overturning it"); Daniel D. Polsby &
Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan
Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 301, 305 (1991) ("The members of a partially self-
constituted legislature depend to a degree upon one another rather than upon their constituents for
their tenure in office. Whatever 'representation' means, it cannot possibly mean that.").
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913).
149. See supra text accompanying note 78.
150. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 169.
151. 1 id. at 406.
152. 1 id. at 169.
153. 1 id. at211.
154. 5 id. at 333.
155. 1 id. at 211.
156. The seminal case in this line is Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 43 (1849) ("It
rest[s] with Congress... to determine upon the means proper to be adopted to fulfil [the
republican] guarantee.").
157. 369 U.S. 186, 218-27 (1962).
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under the Guarantee Clause might have required the Court to step on the
toes of Congress and would have required it to overrule a precedent more
than a century old, 158 but attacking the districting issue was not itself
beyond judicial competence. The Court has on occasion attempted to
supply some content to the republican guarantee. It held in Minor v.
Happersett, for example, that the Guarantee Clause did not require female
suffrage, reasoning that most of the ratifying states did not themselves grant
such suffrage. 159 Sixteen years later, in In re Duncan, Chief Justice Fuller
suggested that a state would not implicate the republican guarantee so long
as it was "in full possession of its faculties as a member of the Union, and
its legislative, executive and judicial departments are peacefully operating
by the orderly and settled methods prescribed by its fundamental law."',60 In
Luther v. Borden, the Court held that the Clause was nonjusticiable but
nonetheless declared that a permanent military government would
"unquestionably" be nonrepublican, "and it would be the duty of Congress
to overthrow it. ' , 161 More recently, in New York v. United States, Justice
O'Connor acknowledged the ambiguity in the Court's cases as to whether
the Guarantee Clause was justiciable but then proceeded to rule on the
merits, holding that coercive Spending Clause legislation did not usurp the
state legislative process so as to deny New York a republican form of
government. 
1 62
This Note suggests that in judging partisan gerrymandering cases,
recourse to the Guarantee Clause, deployed in the limited way I elaborate
below, is preferable to no recourse at all, which is the effect of the current
doctrine. The Baker Court enumerated six factors for defining a "political
question,"' 163 an issue insulated from judicial review because of its political
nature.' 64 When these factors are present, it is thought more sensible as a
policy matter and more appropriate constitutionally for judges to allow the
political process to work itself out. The Court avoided having to confront
the "political question" label in congressional districting cases by deciding
Wesberry under Article I, Section 2 rather than, as Justice Harlan had
urged, under the Elections Clause.165 But the tension introduced by the
opposition between Gralike and Vieth forces us to re-confront the political
158. See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1.
159. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175-76 (1875).
160. 139 U.S. 449, 462 (1891).
161. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45.
162. 505 U.S. 144, 183-86 (1992).
163. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
164. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946) ("It is hostile to a democratic
system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.").
165. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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question doctrine and ask whether judicial review under the Elections
Clause is thereby precluded.
The first prong of the Baker test is "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department."'' 66 Certainly the Elections Clause evinces a textually
demonstrable commitment of the issue of improper state electoral
regulation to a coordinate branch, namely Congress. This is true whether
one views state power over congressional elections as limited to
"procedural" regulations or, as I suggest, to "republican" regulations. The
other five considerations of Justice Brennan's Baker half-dozen hardly
seem more promising. An issue presents a nonjusticiable political question
when the following conditions obtain:
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. 167
When judges attempt to make the difficult decisions about, say, what
standards to apply to racial or partisan gerrymanders, they appear to fall
squarely into just about every category of political question. No "judicially
manageable" standard seems to have emerged from Bandemer, and the
position of slightly less than half of the Supreme Court over the last half-
century has been that this is precisely the reason why congressional
oversight is expressly provided. 168 "[T]heories of effective suffrage,
representation, and the proper apportionment of political power," Justice
Thomas has written, "are questions of political philosophy, not questions of
law."'' 69 As such, these questions should fall within the legislative
prerogative.
Granted. But elections are different from other traditional political
questions in at least one significant respect. Unlike, say, the foreign affairs
166. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1776-78 (2004) (plurality opinion); Davis
v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20, 48 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baker, 369 U.S. at 266-67
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
169. Holder v. Hail, 512 U.S. 874, 901 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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decisions of the President 170  or the impeachment decisions of the
Congress,17 1 the manipulation of electoral outcomes threatens to eviscerate
the democratic check itself, providing the people with no means of redress.
This is indeed the epitome of nonrepublican government. The Framers
knew this, of course, but we have seen that the accountability of Congress
to the people and-given its bicameral structure-to itself informed the
convention delegates' opinions of Congress's competence as the ultimate
judge of election regulations.172 There is reason to believe, however, that
the policing of districting abuse should no longer be viewed as exclusively
within congressional competence. Congress was thought to offer the best
remedy for local partisan abuse because of its institutional structure.
Congress could provide a check, Parsons noted at the Massachusetts
ratifying convention, "without the influence of . . commotions and
factions, who will hear impartially, and preserve and restore to the people
their equal and sacred rights of election."'
' 73
Owing to the unforeseen rise of the national party system, however, this
security plainly no longer exists. As Sanford Levinson and Ernest Young
point out, the election of 1800 "exposed a glaring deficiency of the original
1787 Constitution-the assumption that there would be no party system."'
174
That election, which ended with the House of Representatives choosing
Thomas Jefferson as President over his running mate Aaron Burr,
demonstrated that the Constitution did not contemplate unified party tickets
in presidential races. The Framers by and large structured the Constitution's
various checks and balances under the naive truism that all politics is
local. 17
5
With this context in mind, recall that one of the reasons Congress was
thought free from capture is the competitive relationship between the House
and the Senate. But what happens when loyalty ceases to be institution
based and starts to be party based? 176 Capture of a state legislature by a
170. See, e.g., Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation
of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 215 (1985).
171. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (refusing to review the
impeachment of a federal judge on political question grounds).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
173. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 55, at 27; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 60
(Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that Congress is less vulnerable to interest group capture than the
state legislatures).
174. Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who's Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?,
29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 928 (2001).
175. See GRIFFITH, supra note 110, at 25-26 ("Political parties as organized machines,
operating throughout all colonies and states, can not be said to have existed prior to the
Revolution.").
176. See, e.g., William Crotty, Democratic Ends and Political Parties in America, in THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 177, 183 (Gerald M. Pomper & Marc D. Weiner
eds., 2003) (discussing the strong cohesion and partisan loyalty of political parties in Congress
from a political science perspective).
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political party ceases to offend so long as the same party -controls the House
and Senate, or so long as the opposition party is willing to compromise in
exchange for future considerations. For this reason, and because
gerrymanders involve the rigging of elections themselves, the regular
political process is not entirely trustworthy in policing them.177
B. Judicial Enforcement of the Republican Guarantee
Thus understood, there should be a role for federal judges in reviewing
state regulation of congressional elections when the institutional checks are
dysfunctional. As gerrymanders are presently practiced, that dysfunction
takes the form both of acquiescence to incumbent-protecting gerrymanders,
which redound to the benefit of every member of the House of
Representatives, and partisan gerrymanders, which redound to the benefit
of powerful political parties. Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Marbury v.
Madison that "where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual
rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems exactly clear that
the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the
laws of his country for a remedy."'178 The words capture a principle so
fundamental to the rule of law that it hardly requires restatement: Where the
law defines a right and a duty, it must also provide a remedy.
Congress has a constitutional duty under the Guarantee Clause to
remedy state capture by undemocratic factions through the Elections
Clause. The Guarantee Clause also grants citizens of any particular state so
captured a right to a republican form of government. 179 As in Marbury, the
appropriate remedy would appear to be a writ of mandamus.1 80
Traditionally, mandamus relief is directed at executive officers, to compel
them to perform a ministerial duty such as the delivery of William
Marbury's judicial commission. At English common law, the writ was
"directed to some person, corporation or inferior court, requiring them to do
some particular thing, therein specified, which appertains to their office or
177. Justice Scalia attempts to refute this point by noting that five bills have been introduced
in the House since 1980 aimed at regulating gerrymandering. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769,
1776 (2004) (plurality opinion). Not only have none of these bills been introduced in the last
fourteen years, but none have made it out of committee to the House floor. See H.R. 5037, 10 1st
Cong. (1990); Congressional Districting Reform Act of 1989, H.R. 1711, 101st Cong. (1989);
Redistricting Standards Act of 1983, H.R. 3468, 98th Cong. (1983); Redistricting Standards Act
of 1982, H.R. 5529, 97th Cong. (1982); Fair Representation Act of 1981, H.R. 2349, 97th Cong.
(1981).
178. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
179. Arguably it gives every U.S. citizen such a right. I withhold comment on the thorny
standing issues raised herein.
180. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173.
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duty, and which is supposed to be consonant to right and justice."'' 81
Because the state would be a party were a citizen to challenge a state
legislature's redistricting practices, the Supreme Court could hear the case
under its original jurisdiction. 82 Although redistricting cases are presently
heard by three-judge panels of federal district judges, as required by
statute, 183 the danger of this approach for this Note's project is that it is
undisputed that Congress may at any time alter the jurisdiction of such
courts. 184 The issuance of a writ of mandamus in a Supreme Court original
jurisdiction case arguably would not require an enacting congressional
statute, but rather is inherent in the equitable power given to the judicial
branch as a matter of right under Article 111.185
Two conditions were required for the issuance of a writ of mandamus at
common law. 186 First, the legal right of the complaining party to the
requested relief had to be clearly established; second, the writ had to be the
complainant's sole specific legal remedy.1 87 The second of these criteria is
satisfied by stipulation: The writ of mandamus would issue in a
gerrymandering case in lieu of some other form of equity. No other writ or
order would be legally cognizable. The first criterion-a clearly established
right-appears to be the greater hurdle. It is important for our purposes,
however, to note that a right may be clearly established and nonetheless
involve the exercise of discretionary power.188 I have argued that the
Guarantee Clause and the Elections Clause protect the dyadic rights of the
people both to have congressional representatives in the first place and to
have their choice of representatives free of legislative manipulation.
Imagine, for example, if a state were to refuse outright to send
181. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 614 (1838).
182. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Under present doctrine, the Court would not be
obligated to hear the case, however. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000) (providing less than the full extent of original jurisdiction
authorized by the Constitution by excluding from the statutory grant of original jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court some suits in which a state is a party).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).
184. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. III, § 1.
185. Id. art. III, § 2.
186. The issuance of writs of mandamus presently falls under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), which
purports to grant the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts the power to issue "all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law." The rules of the Supreme Court require a showing that "exceptional
circumstances warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary powers, and that adequate relief
cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court." SUP. CT. R. 20(1). Neither this rule
nor its attendant statute is inconsistent with the common law criteria for the issuance of the writ of
mandamus.
187. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LEGAL REMEDIES OF MANDAMUS AND
PROHIBITION, HABEAS CORPUS, CERTIORARI, AND QUO WARRANTO 1 (photo. reprint 1997)
(Charles F. Bridge ed., Albany, N.Y., W.C. Little & Co., 3d rev. & enlarged ed. 1896).
188. See id. at 3 ("Although a mandamus does not lie to control a discretionary power, yet it
will compel the exercise of such power in cases where it legally exists ... ").
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representatives to Congress, and Congress were to neglect to correct the
error. Any objection to judicial intervention in this hypothetical situation
would not take the form of an argument that the right was not clearly
established. It would more likely either invoke the political question
doctrine or suggest that Congress is not an appropriate respondent. Parts I
and I1 of this Note demonstrated that protection against an intentional
gerrymander is no less a constitutional duty of Congress than protection
against state refusal to send representatives. One would not, therefore,
argue against judicial cognizance of intentional gerrymandering by denying
that it refers to a clearly established right. Thus, the two traditional criteria
for the issuance of a mandamus are satisfied.
The more obvious obstacle to such a writ being issued in a redistricting
case, of course, is that the duty belongs not to an executive officer or
inferior tribunal but to the Congress generally. It would seem to offend the
most basic principles of separation of powers for the Supreme Court to
attempt to compel Congress to perform its higher-law duties. 189 Such an
attempt would present a Marbury problem writ large: Just as Secretary of
State Madison might have done had the Court ordered him to deliver
Marbury's commission, Congress can always say, in effect, "You and what
army?" This only emphasizes, however, that the obstacles to the issuance of
common law extraordinary writs against coordinate branches of
government are prudential, not per se constitutional. The fact that Congress
may well ignore an order to provide a remedy to an unconstitutional
gerrymander is no reason not to issue one. Rather than provoke a
constitutional crisis, ignoring such an order would merely represent an
exercise of Congress's political will, to be judged like all other decisions its
members make: at the polls.
A writ of mandamus against a legislative body is not unheard of in the
state courts. 190 Just two years ago, Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn
successfully petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus
to compel the state legislature to fulfill its constitutional duty to fund the
state's public schools.' 91 More specifically, the court's action suspended
operation of a ballot initiative requiring a supermajority for any legislation
that increased public revenue, in order to break a stalemate and allow the
189. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 US. 447, 488 (1923) ("The general rule is that neither
[governmental] department may invade the province of the other and neither may control, direct
or restrain the action of the other.").
190. See, e.g., Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature of Fla., 269 So. 2d 684
(Fla. 1972) (denying a mandamus application by schoolteachers to order the legislature to set
collective bargaining standards but noting the court's jurisdiction to so intervene); Twenty-First
Judicial Dist. Court v. State, 563 So. 2d 1185, 1193-94 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (noting the availability
of a writ of mandamus to compel the legislature to fund the state court system as required by the
state constitution).
191. Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003).
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legislature to pass a school funding bill.192 The court defended its decision
against the charge of legislating from the bench by noting that "[r]esolution
of the impasse was entirely in the hands of the legislature." 193 Similarly, the
writ I urge here would not infringe upon legislative discretion; it would
merely enable the U.S. Supreme Court, acting as a court of equity, to do
what one commentator said the Nevada Supreme Court had done in Guinn:
"decide cases, no matter what the identity of the parties, the subject matter
of the dispute, or the likely political fallout.'
' 94
The antigerrymander writ could issue upon a finding of an attempted
partisan gerrymander, drawing evidence from, for example, unexplained
deviances from facially neutral districting criteria such as compactness and
respect for municipal boundaries, partisan lockup of the districting process
itself, public comments, or internal memoranda. In his concurring opinion
in Vieth, Justice Kennedy wrote, "That no [workable gerrymander] standard
has emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge
in the future."1 95 His definition of a gerrymander echoes Justice Stewart's
infamous definition of obscenity: "I know it when I see it., 96 Both our
intuition and our constitutional history compel the conclusion that partisan
attempts to capture a state's congressional slate by reorganizing districts
according to previous voting patterns are, as even Justice Scalia appears to
acknowledge, undemocratic. 97 In this instance, given the express
commands of Article IV, the difficulty of remedying the problem should
not prevent a judge from declaring one.
Objections to judicial cognizance of partisan gerrymandering-those, at
least, that reach beyond the surface of the "political question" obstacle-
tend overwhelmingly to focus on the inevitability and predictability of
partisan effects in the drawing of district lines. 98 Because there are no
192. Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 76 P.3d 22, 32 (Nev. 2003) (dismissal of petition for
rehearing).
193. Id.
194. Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Most Rational Branch: Guinn v. Legislature and the
Judiciary's Role as Helpful Arbiter of Conflict, 4 NEV. L.J. 518, 520 (2004).
195. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1795 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
196. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
197. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 674
(2002) ("[lt is almost impossible to design institutions to be authentically nonpartisan and
politically disinterested."); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and
Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1351 (1987) ("All rules advantage some
players and disadvantage others, and almost all do so more or less systematically."); see also
Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public
Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 75 (1985) (commenting that the various
proposals for "neutral" districting "are not neutral, .. . not grounded in broader principles that
command general assent, and in many cases... are incoherent and cannot be made to work").
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politically neutral districting criteria, the argument goes, involving
putatively neutral judges in the process is misguided and cannot solve any
perceived problem of unfairness.' 99 An attempt standard need not reject this
argument. Even if we believe either that intentional partisan gerrymanders
are no more injurious to democratic values than predictable partisan effects
in districting 00 or that intentional gerrymandering is simply inevitable, a
standard that renders unconstitutional all legislative attempts to dictate the
outcome of a congressional election would not require reviewing Justices to
base decisions on their personal political philosophies or to engage in
unprincipled explorations into the political effects of districting schemes.
Instead, they would focus on the same relatively narrow evidentiary
question asked in other Elections Clause cases: Was the state legislature
attempting to be neutral?2 °1 If not,202 the legislature has violated the
Elections Clause. The ultimate remedy, however, would lie not with the
Court but with Congress, pursuant to an open-ended judicial order. Call it a
declaratory judgment with teeth.20 3 The imprimatur of a Supreme Court
order would dramatically raise the visibility of Congress's neglect of its
duty to guarantee republican government, a duty otherwise impaired by a
failure of political will.
C. Congressional Enforcement of the Republican Guarantee
Issuing a writ that merely orders Congress to provide a remedy rather
than the Court instituting its own should significantly mitigate concerns
about judicial competence to entertain political questions. Congress would
be free to fashion any number of remedies. In an individual case, it could
199. See Schuck, supra note 198, at 1353-56.
200. But see Polsby & Popper, supra note 147, at 313 ("It is one thing for a phenomenon to
exist by necessity, and quite another for someone to distribute or redistribute it selectively.").
201. One might well ask at this point why similar logic does not apply to race-based
redistricting. Indeed it may apply, though probing the question is beyond the contours of this
Note. Suffice it to say that whether or not the answer is the same, the question of whether a state
legislative majority that manipulates congressional district lines for the benefit of its political
party constitutes "republican government" is analytically distinct from the question of whether
doing so to improve the representation of racial minorities constitutes the same. See McConnell,
supra note 109, at 116; cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (articulating a theory of judicial review whose linchpin is access to the
political process).
202. Although the precise details of the standard would be left to federal common law, it is
safe to assume that it would require some mitigation of the discretion of political officials in the
line-drawing process. Evidence might include unexplained deviations from traditional
considerations of contiguity and compactness, partisan comments by line drawers, or suspicious
code used in computer models.
203. It is important to note that unlike an advisory opinion, expressly disfavored under our
jurisprudence, see Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792), a writ of mandamus to
Congress would be self-executing as a matter of law.
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establish a special master or appoint an ad hoc committee to rework a
state's districting scheme. It could also act affirmatively to establish an
independent federal agency authorized to review district lines generally. Or
it could require independent state commissions to set district boundaries
according to nonpartisan principles, subject to further oversight. °4 Any of
these solutions would advance the ball closer to what Justice Scalia and
others have recognized as the democratic ideal.
My own preference is somewhat more radical, though it piggybacks on
the rule that Judge Michael McConnell has concluded is most consistent
with the requirements of the Guarantee Clause:20 5 He would require that
district boundaries conform to traditional political boundaries such as city
and county lines, absent a compelling, nonpartisan reason. McConnell
argues that before the Supreme Court's decision in Wesberry established
the one-person-one-vote rule for federal elections, "[a]dherence to...
traditional boundaries was, historically, the principal constraint on creative
districting., 20 6 He would restore this rule, and thereby eviscerate the cultish
devotion to precise mathematical equality among districts within a state.2 °7
Although McConnell's approach would not make gerrymandering
impossible, it would eliminate "the grotesquely shaped districts that feature
so prominently in today's maps. 20 8 Moreover, making district boundaries
presumptively coextensive with familiar political divisions rather than with
households prescreened for partisan bias exposes attempted gerrymanders
to far more rigorous public scrutiny than any other precommitment.
Whatever political check is thought to constrain partisan gerrymanders
cannot function effectively so long as the line-drawing process remains a
black box. Altering district boundaries that have themselves been
gerrymandered would involve a one-time shakeup that would require many
House incumbents to face each other in elections, but this would merely be
a nonpartisan version of what already increasingly occurs on a partisan
basis.20 9
I would go one step further than McConnell. I would additionally
advocate repeal of the provision of the Reapportionment Act of 1967
requiring single-member districting. 2'0 The result would be that states
204. See Issacharoff, supra note 17, at 626 (discussing Iowa's use of such commissions);
Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837 (1997).
205. See McConnell, supra note 109.
206. Id. at 103; see supra Part II.
207. See McConnell, supra note 109, at 107-09.
208. Id. at 115.
209. See, e.g., Charles Babington & Juliet Eilperin, GOP Hopes To Expand Its Majority; 4
Democratic Veterans Lose in Texas Contests, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2004, at A17 (noting that four
Democratic incumbents in Texas lost, two to other incumbents, following a GOP-engineered
redistricting plan).
210. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
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would be forced to honor traditional political boundaries but would be free
to fashion at-large congressional districts, subject to the constraints of the
Voting Rights Act.21 1 Allowing at-large voting would reduce the total
number of opportunities for gerrymandering. Of course, the use of at-large
voting traditionally has had the effect (and often the purpose) of
suppressing minority votes, and so relaxing the single-member district
requirement might be reflexively troubling.1 2 However, the constraint of
adherence to the Voting Rights Act would not only substantially mitigate
this concern, but would also incentivize states to experiment with more
creative means of aggregating votes than the present first-past-the-post
213 214system. Cumulative voting and limited voting, for example, both rely
on at-large districts and have been touted as particularly promising ways of
continuing to ensure minority representation without sinking into the Shaw
v. Reno quagmire.21 5 Neither of these voting methods had been invented
when the Reapportionment Act of 1842 was originally passed, but they
accomplish the same end. 216 As Justice Black said of at-large districting,
"[I]t has an element of virtue that the more convenient method does not
have-namely, it does not discriminate against some groups to favor others,
it gives all the people an equally effective voice in electing their




This Note concludes that Justice Stevens got it partly right. The
Elections Clause power was not meant as a constitutional license for state
211. Under the 1982 amendments to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, there is a prohibition
on any "standard, practice, or procedure ... which results in a denial or abridgement of the right
of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)
(2000). The amended section 2 is interpreted as instantiating a disparate impact test in districting
cases, among other cases. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
212. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 183
(discussing the use of multimember districts to dilute the black vote).
213. Under a cumulative voting system, each voter can cast as many votes as there are
candidates; thus, intensity of support is rewarded. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 106, at
1099.
214. Limited voting systems provide voters with more than one vote, but fewer votes than the
total number of candidates. See id. at 1141.
215. See Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States,
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 251; supra note 23 and accompanying text.
216. See Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 215, at 253 ("Although the concept of alternative
voting systems had not been developed at that time, the principles on which it rests are the same
as those behind the move away from at-large elections to districts: representative bodies ought to
be broadly representative of the political community as a whole, rather than of the interests of
only a bloc-voting majority.").
217. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 574 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting).
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governments to do as they please with the machinery of congressional
elections. But as my historical analysis demonstrates, the limiting principle
is "republicanism," not "process," and the ultimate police of those limits is
the Congress, not the Court. Under such limits, the constitutional sin at
issue in Cook v. Gralike, if there was one, may not necessarily have been a
violation of the Elections Clause.2 18 Under the standard I have articulated,
the plaintiff would have had to introduce evidence that the ballot labels at
issue in Gralike were intended to dictate electoral outcomes; to call the
labels defective because "nonprocedural" would be supposition.
But Justice Scalia got it only partly right as well. The evasiveness of
judicially manageable means of reining in partisan gerrymandering is a
function of continued operation under standards-the Equal Protection
Clause, the First Amendment, the Qualifications Clauses-that do not fit
the constitutional injury. Partisan gerrymandering deals its blows to
political fair play, not to discrete and insular minorities. Though remedial
power over the Elections Clause is appropriately exercised by Congress,
that body is constitutionally required to guarantee to the states a republican
form of government. To the extent that its ability to perform this duty
impartially is hampered by considerations of party or self-interest, the
courts have a role in securing the blessings of liberty to the citizens of the
affected state and of the United States generally. They must, however, play
that role mindful of the limits of their competence. That they may know
undemocratic gerrymandering when they see it does not mean they can or
should remedy it.
It is no secret now, nor has it ever been, that politicians are, as one
commentator has remarked of men more generally, only as faithful as their
options. 219 Those who have the power to gerrymander or otherwise disrupt
the neutral operation of the political process will do so. Whether we simply
tolerate their actions or rather apply the power of the general government
against them is a question of our normative expectations. This Note's
inquiry into the history of the Elections Clause is meant to demonstrate that
the Clause was included within the Constitution in contemplation of the
danger that state legislatures might capture their congressional slates in
their own interests. The Framers entrusted Congress with oversight of the
218. 1 tend to agree with the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, which decided
the case on First Amendment grounds. See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 530-53 (2001)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("I believe that Article VIII violates the First Amendment right of a
political candidate, once lawfully on the ballot, to have his name appear unaccompanied by
pejorative language required by the State."). But see Vicki C. Jackson, Cook v. Gralike: Easy
Cases and Structural Reasoning, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 311-12 (arguing that Gralike could
have been decided on overarching structural principles of republicanism rather than the Elections
Clause specifically).
219. See Chris Rock: Bigger & Blacker (HBO television broadcast, July 10, 1999).
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process fully believing in the power of a kind of vertical political
competition that is belied by experience. While they are not competent
themselves to do away with gerrymanders, judges surely can recognize that
political party dominance and bipartisan gerrymandering threaten the
republican character of the nation. In such circumstances, their institutional
voice may be its only hope.
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